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NEGLIGENCE-APPLICATION oP TBB RBscuE DoCTRINE WHBRB PERSONAL
PROPERTY IS INVOLVED-The defendant's servant, while parking the defendant's
automobile, negligently failed to secure the brakes. At defendant's request, plaintiff police officer attempted to enter the automobile after it had started to roll,
hoping to avert any possible collision. In so doing, he slipped on a stone and was
injured. Defendant demurred to plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that the plain-
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tiff was contributorily negligent, as a matter of law, and that the rescue doctrine
should not apply where that rescued from peril created by the defendant is not
human life or the rescuer's own property. Held, the rescue doctrine was correctly
applied even though the thing rescued was not the property of the plaintiff. It
was a question of fact for the jury whether the plaintiff's conduct amounted to
contributory negligence. Rushton v. Howle (Ga. 1949) 53 S.E. (2d) 768.
The rescue doctrine allows a plaintiff to recover for injuries sustained in reasonable attempts at rescuing a thing exposed to danger by the defendant's negligence.1 The problem which has concerned the courts in cases of this kind is
whether the plaintiff should be barred from recovery because of the voluntary
nature of his act of intervention in the face of a known peril.2 Thus, the question
has been whether (1) the plaintiff's act should be considered as having broken the
chain of causation, or (2) i:he act should place the plaintiff under the general
common law disability in regard to voluntary assumption of risk, or (3) the act
should bar the plaintiff as being contributorily negligent. The factors affecting
any decision are the extent that legal, social, or moral duties have influenced the
voluntary nature of the plaintiff's act, and the general public benefit which would
result from what might be called an exception to the general rule of assumption
of risk. In those cases where the subject of rescue has been a human life, the
answer is clear.3 A recognition of the social forces influencing the decision of one
who sees another in danger, as well as a respect for human life, have led courts to
allow the plaintiff recovery. Where mere property has been involved, there are
cases in which it is summarily held that the rescue doctrine should not be extended.4 There is strong authority, however, for the position that there should
be no distinction between cases where life or property is the subject of rescue, at
least when the plaintiff can be said to be under more than a purely social duty to
prevent destruction. Thus, when the plaintiff is the owner of the property,5 or
1 It is important to remember that this discussion deals only with those attempts at
rescue which, in view of the circumstances, can be considered reasonable. Some factors which
must be taken into account are (1) the value of that which was rescued, (2) the risk that
appeared involved to the rescuer, and (3) the relationship between the rescuer and that
which was rescued. See Cote v. Palmer, 127 Conn. 321, 16 A. (2d) 595 (1940); McKay v.
Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 160 N.C. 260, 75 S.E. 1081 (1912); Wagner v. International Ry.,
232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921).
2 For an analysis of the problems involved see BoHT,EN, STUDIES IN THE I.Aw OF TonTs,
c. 6 (1926). Prof. Goodhart shows how the basic inquiry is in regard to assumption of risk
in "Rescue and Voluntary Assumption of Risk," 5 CA.i."\ffi. L.J. 192 (1934).
3 Eckert v. Long Island Ry., 43 N.Y. 502 (1871). Cardozo writes a colorful opinion in
support of the Eckert case in Wagner v. International Ry., supra, note I. See also Brugh v.
Bigelow, 310 Mich. 74, 16 N.W. (2d) 668 (1944).
4 Eversole v. Wabash Ry., 249 Mo. 523, 155 s:w. 419 (1913); Delano Mill Co. v.
Osgood, (C.C.A. 1st, 1917) 246 F. 273; Johnson v. Terminal R. Assn., 320 Mo. 884, 8
S.W. (2d) 821 (1928); Cook v. Johnston, 58 Mich. 437, 25 N.W. 388 (1885). But cf.
Eckert v. Long Island Ry., supra, note 3.
5 lliinois Central Ry. v. Siler, 229 ill. 390, 82 N.E. 362 (1907); Wardrop v. Santi
Moving Express Co., 233 N.Y. 227, 135 N.E. 272 (1922); McKay v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry.,
supra, note I.
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employed by the owner, 6 the weight of authority holds that he is protected in his
reasonable attempts at its rescue. While there is no legal duty on the plaintiff in
these cases to subject himself to any risk, he is required, for the purpose of mitigating damages, or by his contract with his employer, to display at least a minimum
standard of reasonable care toward the property. Failure to follow the rescue
doctrine might place a premium on unfaithful service or subject the owner of
property to the unfair risk of acting at his peril. Finally, there is some authority
that the plaintiff need be under no obligation at all with respect to the property. 7
Thus, in the case of Liming v. Illinois Central Ry.,8 it was recognized that the
social duty of the plaintiff to prevent unnecessary destruction of property, coupled
with the public censure which might accrue should plaintiff fail to come to the
aid of his neighbor, were in themselves sufficient reason to justify application of
the doctrine. In the present case the decision is placed on this broad ground. There
is an additional factor, however, in that plaintiff is a police officer. Here again
the court might well feel that the danger of fostering unfaithful service should
weigh heavily in plaintiff's favor. Nevertheless, it is believed that the broader
ground is preferable in that it best serves the public interest and allows the jury,
peculiarly suited for this purpose, to be the ultimate judge of human relations.
Thomas Hartwell

6 The doctrine was extended to employees in Hollenback v. Stone and Webster Engineering Corp., 46 Mont. 559, 129 P. 1058 (1913); Henshaw v. Belyea, 220 Cal. 458, 31 P.
(2d) 348 (1934). In this last case there is an excellent discussion of the various decisions.
But, cf. Johnson v. Terminal R. Assn., supra, note 4, and Delano Mill Co. v. Osgood, supra,
note 4, where the employees' acts were considered beyond the scope of their employment.
7Liming v. ill. Central Ry., 81 Iowa 246, 47 N.W. 66 (1890); Johannsen v. MidContinent Petroleum Co., 232 Iowa 805, 5 N.W. (2d) 20 (1942); Henry v. Cleveland,
C. C. and St. L. R. Co., 67 F. 426 (1895).
8 Supra, note 7.

